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Employee Involvement in Decision-
Making: European Attempts at
Harmonization
Ruth A. Harvey*
Two critical issues face the European Community today-rising unemploy-
ment and increasing industrial decline.' In order to properly address these
concerns, the Community must take an active role in the formation of a Commu-
nity industrial strategy.2 This strategy cannot be successful unless it includes
measures harmonizing the rights of Community employees in the management of
the enterprise.
The Community's status as a supranational organization requires a different
approach to industrial planning than the approach of a sovereign state. The
Community maintains only the power delegated to it by the Treaty of Rome and
subsequent interpretation of the Treaty.3 It does not have complete control over
the industrial policies of the Member States and, because there is no effective
enforcement mechanism, the Community must rely upon legitimacy and respect
to ensure that its policies are adopted and implemented. The differing legal,
historical, and social backgrounds of the Member States require that the Commu-
nity take a variety of interests into account when implementing an industrial
strategy. 4
Incentives to develop a comprehensive industrial policy are strong, however.
Research and development, and the restructuring of basic industries are more
* Ruth A. Harvey is a member of the class of 1985, University of Michigan Law School.
1. COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, PROGRAMME OF THE COMMISSION FOR
1983-1984, at 5-27 (1983) (Address by Mr. Gaston Thorn, President of the Commission of the
European Communities to the European Parliament on 8 February 1983).
2. OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITY'S INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY 22 (1983).
3. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Rome]. This note uses the term European Community in
accordance with the resolution of the European Parliament. Resolution on a single designation for the
Community, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 63) 36 (1978). The six original Member States were the
Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined the Community on January 1, 1973. Greece
became the tenth Member State on January 1, 1981.
4. See generally COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION AND
COMPANY STRUCTURE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, BULL. EUR. COMM. SUPP. 8/75 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as THE GREEN PAPER].
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effective if promoted at the Community level. 5 In addition, the Community is
stronger economically if its industries compete together against foreign markets
such as the United States (U.S.) and Japan rather than against each other.
The economic and commercial measures taken by the Community have pro-
moted the development of Community-wide markets and consequently have
increased the need for a Community industrial policy. Because of past Commu-
nity efforts, capital, goods, and workers are moving with increasing regularity
throughout the Community. Community enterprises are increasing in size and
impact, and many enterprises operate in more than one Member State.
Because of increased Community-wide economic development, Member
States are less able to control corporate activity at a national level. Unions have
also been unable to exert a powerful influence over transnational corporations.
Thus, the Community must bear the burden of ensuring that economic and
technological progress does not have a detrimental impact on Community work-
ers.
The Commission of the European Communities 6 has recognized that Commu-
nity policies must protect workers from the adverse impact of common market
policies. 7 Since 1971 the Commission has concerned itself with the protection of
Community workers . 8 The Commission promulgated a comprehensive program
for the implementation of a Community social policy in 1974.9
5. OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITY'S INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY 37 (1983). See generally Gormley & Marchipont, Aspects of the
European Community's Industrial Policy, 6 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 79 (1985).
6. See infra note 19.
7. See COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, REPORT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
SOCIAL SITUATION IN THE COMMUNITY IN 1971, at 8-13 (1972). The introduction to the report
focuses on the need for a Community industrial policy in the area of employment. The Commission
identifies five factors connected with the implementation of the common market which have had an
important impact upon employment. (1) An integrated market and increased competition have re-
sulted in major structural changes in industry. This, in turn, has resulted in changes in the distribution
of work throughout the Community. (2) Increasing world competition and the establishment of the
Common External Tariff have had serious repercussions on industries which are sensitive to interna-
tional trade. (3) An integrated market and increased competition have speeded up technological
progress and the evolution of employment. The Commission advocates a common industrial policy in
order to better distribute the benefits of this progress. (4) The rise in the standard of living has altered
the character of private consumption. It has increased employment opportunities in areas such as
tourism. (5) The increased prevalence of multinationals has increased the need for multinational
regulation of these enterprises. The report concludes that the integration process has given employ-
ment problems a European dimension which must be addressed at the Community level in a compre-
hensive manner. See id.
8. In 1971, the European Social Fund was reorganized in order to transform it into "an instrument
of a more active employment policy and to link it more effectively with Community policy objec-
tives." COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES
OF THE NEW EUROPEAN SOCIAL FUND, 1973, at 5 (1973). See also Council Decision 71/66/EEC of
Feb. 1, 1971, 14 J.O. EUR. COMM. (No. L 28) 15 (1971).
Also, a Standing Committee on Employment was established in March 1971. The committee's
function was to coordinate the employment policies of the Member States by harmonizing them with
the policies of the Community. See COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 7, at 7.
See also Comm'n of the European Communities, Provisions Protecting Workers in Case of
Dismissal in Legislation in the Member Countries of the European Communities, 4 BULL. INST. LAB.
REL. 171 (1973).
9. COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SOCIAL ACTION PROGRAMME, BULL. EUR.
COMM. SuPP. 2/74 (1974) (outlining a comprehensive program for the Community in social policy
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The Commission's proposals fall into two distinct categories. The first, empha-
sizing security in employment, calls for the approximation of the laws of the
Member States to resolve specific problems. Using this approach, the Commu-
nity has granted workers the right to consultation with management at critical
times such as when jobs are immediately threatened. This approach does not
further the formulation of a comprehensive Community policy. It merely aids
Member States and workers in planning for structural change.
The second approach advocates fundamental change in the employment rela-
tionship by requiring that employees be continuously represented in corporate
decision making at its highest levels. This would give employees a voice in
decisions made at a supranational level. This participatory approach does not
require that the Community directly intervene in the employment relationship.
Rather, the Community would establish procedures for transnational consultation
and increase the bargaining power of Community employees, thereby permitting
management and employees to agree between themselves on policy.
Part I of this note examines the sources of Community power over employment
policy. Part II analyzes two Community directives approximating laws regarding
employee involvement in dismissal procedures. It also examines the impact of
these Community directives on two Member States, the Federal Republic of
Germany (FRG or West Germany) and the United Kingdom. The note focuses on
the FRG because its statutes have served as the model for Community directives,
and because the harmonization of laws throughout the Community will provide
unique benefits to the FRG. 10 The note examines the United Kingdom because its
government has historically had a limited impact upon worker-management rela-
tions, and compliance with Community directives often involves significant al-
teration to existing statutes. Part III focuses on Community proposals that would
directly involve employees in the management of the enterprise. It considers the
obstacles to implementation of these proposals and the potential for adoption.
The note argues that the directives which have been adopted illustrate the concern
of the Community and its awareness that further action is necessary. It concludes,
however, that the directives do not offer significant protection to Community
workers. Although the proposals for participation in management are promising,
political obstacles are likely to block implementation.
I. SOURCES OF COMMUNITY POWER OVER EMPLOYMENT POLICY
The European Economic Community was founded in 1957 to establish a
common market and to promote the harmonious development of economic ac-
tivities in its Member States. 1l The Treaty of Rome, the source of power for all
areas). For current developments, see COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, REPORT ON
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS, published annually in conjunction with the General Report on the Activities
of the European Communities. The REPORT includes chapters on employment, vocational guidance,
industrial relations, and working conditions and labor law.
10. Worker participation in decision-making is a cost to the employer. As long as worker participa-
tion legislation is more extensive in the FRG than in other Member States, investors have an incentive
to locate plants outside of the FRG. Once these laws are harmonized, the FRG will no longer be at a
disadvantage in attracting investment.
11. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, at art. 2.
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activities of the Community, functions similarly to a constitution. In contrast to
the Constitution of the United States, which sets out the structure and power of
the federal government with broad guidelines, the Treaty of Rome is detailed and
specific. Its 246 articles provide precise information concerning the power and
scope of Community activities. 12
Although the predominant activities of the Community focus on economic
development, the preamble of the Treaty of Rome explicitly states that the ulti-
mate goal of the Community is the betterment of the living and working condi-
tions of Community citizens.' 3 These two areas of Community concern,
economic policy and social policy,14 are discussed in separate sections of the
Treaty and are sharply distinguished throughout the document. The drafters do
not appear to have considered economic development dependent upon or interre-
lated with social development. As a result, the Treaty of Rome does not explicitly
require the consideration of worker interests in the development of economic
policy.
A. Explicit Sources of Power
Despite the Treaty of Rome's comprehensive character and resemblance to a
constitution, it does little to protect the civil rights of Community nationals. 15
12. Teaty of Rome, supra note 3, at art. 3 sets forth the envisioned activities of the Community. It
states:
[tihe activities of the Community shall include ...
(a) the elimination, as between Member States of customs duties and of quantitative
restrictions on the import and export of goods, and of all other measures having equivalent
effect;
(b) the establishment of a common customs tariff and of a common commercial policy
towards third countries;
(c) the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to freedom of movement for
persons, services and capital;
(d) the adoption of a common policy in the sphere of agriculture;
(e) the adoption of a common policy in the sphere of transport;
(f) the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common market is not
distorted;
(g) the application of procedures by which the economic policies of Member States can be
coordinated and disequilibria in their balances of payments remedied;
(h) the approximation of the laws of Member States to the extent required for the proper
functioning of the common market;
(i) the creation of a European Social Fund in order to improve employment opportunities
for workers and to contribute to the raising of their standard of living;
(j) the establishment of a European Investment Bank to facilitate the economic expansion of
the Community by opening up fresh resources;
(k) the association of the overseas countries and territories in order to increase trade and to
promote jointly economic and social development.
13. reaty of Rome, supra note 3, at Preamble ("Affirming as the essential objective of their efforts
the constant improvement of the living and working conditions of their peoples. ) (emphasis
added).
14. Social policy includes all matters directly relating to the treatment of workers. See generally
'ITeaty of Rome, supra note 3, at arts. 117-128 (empowering the Community to take actions aimed at
improving the standard of living of Community workers).
15. But see reaty of Rome, supra note 3, at art. 7 (prohibiting discrimination), art. 48 (guarantee-
ing the free movement of workers), and art. 119 (guaranteeing equal pay for men and women).
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The Treaty does not contain provisions guaranteeing individual rights, and only
two sections specifically consider labor issues. The first outlines policies encour-
aging the free movement of workers throughout the common market, 16 and the
second delineates the Community's social policy. 17
The chapter on social policy guarantees workers a number of specific rights"
but does not grant the Community the power to directly regulate social policy in
the Member States. The Commission of the European Communities" is granted
the authority to administer the European Social Fund20 and may study and report
on the state of social policy in the Community. 21 The Commission is not, how-
ever, explicitly delegated the power to implement its findings regarding social
policy.
B. Implicit Sources of Power
The lack of explicit power in the Treaty of Rome does not preclude Community
intervention in matters concerning employment policy. Article 100 is a broad and
far-reaching provision which can be used for this purpose.22 It requires the
Council of Ministers for the European Community to issue directives in order to
approximate the laws of the Member States. 23 There are no subject matter limita-
16. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, at arts. 48-51 (concerning the free movement of workers
throughout the Member States). Much has been written on the free movement of workers throughout
the Community. See generally T. HARTLEY, EEC IMMIGRATION LAW (1978); O'Keeffe, Practical
Difficulties in the Application of Article 48 of the EEC Treaty, 19 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 35 (1982).
17. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, at arts. 117-128.
18. See, e.g., Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, at art. 119 (requiring "the application of the principle
that men and women should receive equal pay for equal work"). This right has been held to be
directly applicable in the Member States. See Defrenne v. Sabena, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 455, 18
Common Mkt. L. Rep. No. 2, at 98 (1976).
19. The governing bodies of the European Community are the Commission, the Council of
Ministers, and the European Parliament. For a discussion of the powers and functions of these
Community organs and their relationships with each other, see T. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (1981); P. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (3d
ed. 1980).
20. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, at arts. 123-128. The European Social Fund has "the task of
rendering the employment of workers easier and of increasing their geographical and occupational
mobility within the Community." Id. at art. 123.
The Fund is presided over by a committee of representatives from governments, trade unions and
employers' organizations. It funds projects proposed by the Member States. These projects target
groups hurt by current economic conditions. See generally COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITIES, TWELFTH REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL FUND (1984).
21. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, at art. 118. See also id. at art. 122.
22. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, at art. 100 provides:
The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, issue directives for the
approximation of such provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member
States as directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common market.
The Assembly and the Economic and Social Committee shall be consulted in the case of directives
whose implementation would, in one or more Member States, involve the amendment of legislation.
23. A directive is one of five types of actions which the Council of Ministers is authorized to take
under the Treaty of Rome. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, at art, 189. Once a directive is adopted, the
national authorities of each Member State are required to enact their own laws and/or regulations
giving effect to the directive. This procedure allows Member States to implement directives in a
manner that takes into account their own national institutions and political processes.
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tions for the use of Article 100 as long as the proposed directive "directly
affect[s] the establishment or functioning of the common market." 24 Article 100
is regularly used in conjunction with Article 117 to promote improved working
conditions for Community citizens. 25 The major barrier to enacting a directive
under Article 100 is the requirement that directives be adopted by unanimous
consent of the Council. 
26
A second provision, Article 235, delegates to the Council potentially unlimited
authority to issue directives or regulations affecting all facets of working life in
the Community. 27 This article may only be invoked when the Treaty of Rome has
not otherwise provided the necessary powers. When such a situation occurs, the
Council may, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, take
whatever action is necessary to promote the objectives of the Treaty. 28 Since one
objective of the Treaty of Rome is the improvement of the living and working
conditions of Community citizens,2 9 Article 235 could legitimately be used to
regulate activity in this area.
Community authority over employment policies can also be inferred from
narrower provisions of the Treaty of Rome. In pursuit of the abolition of re-
strictions on freedom of establishment, the Council has the authority under
Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty of Rome to issue directives that make equivalent
safeguards enabling freedom of establishment throughout the Community. 30 It is
not obvious that this provision includes powers over labor policies since employ-
If a Member State does not take appropriate measures to comply with a directive, the Commission
may first deliver an opinion on the matter and, if this does not resolve the issue, bring the matter
before the European Court of Justice. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, at art. 169. If the Court of Justice
finds for the Commission, it will require the Member State to take the measures necessary to comply
with the directive.
Directives are sometimes ineffective as a tool for harmonization. Widely differing procedures can
be used to implement the provisions of a directive. As a result, the laws of the Member States can
remain quite different even after the implementation of a directive.
24. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, at art. 100.
25. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, at art. 117 ("Member States agree upon the need to promote
improved working conditions and an improved standard of living for workers, so as to make possible
their harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained ...").
26. The unanimity requirement substantially restricts the content of directives adopted by the
Council of Ministers. The Council consists of representatives of the governments of the Member
States. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, at art. 146. These representatives are directly responsible to the
heads of the states from which they come and represent the views of their state. As a result, the
process leading to agreement on a proposed directive is highly politicized.
27. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, at art. 235 provides:
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation
of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community, and this Treaty has not
provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the
Commission and after consulting the Assembly, take the appropriate measures.
28. Article 235 of the Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, does not specify what type of action the
Council may take. Presumably, any of the five types of action specified by Article 189 of the Treaty of
Rome would be permissible. See generally supra note 23.
29. See supra note 14.
30. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, at art. 52 ("[Rlestrictions on the freedom of establishment
of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be abolished in
progressive stages in the course of the transitional period...").
See also Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, at art. 54, providing that:
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ment is not necessarily dependent upon corporate structure. Nevertheless, the
Commission has offered, and the Council is currently debating, a proposal based
on Article 54(3)(g). 31 An advantage of implementing measures under Article
54(3)(g) is that the Council may adopt directives by a qualified majority, thus
avoiding the unanimity requirement of Articles 100 and 235.32
Although the Treaty of Rome grants the Community little direct power over
employment policy, a well-developed policy is not beyond the scope of the
Treaty. Articles 100, 235 and 54(3)(g) of the Treaty of Rome can legitimately be
used to implement Community employment policies. The primary obstacle to a
Community policy is not the lack of authority under the Treaty of Rome, but
disagreement among the Member States as to the proper form and content of this
policy.
II. HARMONIZATION OF LAWS REGARDING EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT
IN DISMISSAL PROCEDURES
The Community has to date adopted two directives harmonizing the employ-
ment policies of the Member States. Both directives require the harmonization of
laws relating to the dismissal of large numbers of employees. The purpose of the
directives is to increase the protections available to employees in the Member
States. Neither directive grants the Community a policy-making role in the field
of employment security.
A. The Directive on Collective Redundancies
33
Community Directive 75/129 on collective redundancies, 34 adopted in 1975
and based on Articles 100 and 117 of the Treaty of Rome, 35 is the most ambitious
1) [Tihe Council shall . . . draw up a general programme for the abolition of existing
restrictions on freedom of establishment within the Community.
3) The Council and the Commission shall carry out the duties devolving upon them under
the preceeding provisions, in particular:
(g) by coordinating to the necessary extent the safeguards which, for the protection of the
interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies or firms...
with a view to making such safeguards equivalent throughout the Community.
31. See infra notes 120-147 and accompanying text.
32. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, at art. 148. Article 148 sets out the procedure for determin-
ing a qualified majority. The votes of each country are weighted so that it is impossible to obtain a
qualified majority unless at least three of the four major Community powers (the FRG, France, Italy,
and the United Kingdom) support the measure.
33. Redundancy is a British term signifying a worker who is dismissed because the needs of the
employer have changed and not because of any wrongdoing on the part of the worker. Collective
redundancies take place when several employees are laid off, as when a plant closes or there is a
major change in the workforce due to technological advances. The statutory definition of redundancy
is included in the Employment Protection Consolidation Act, 1978, ch. 81(2) (United Kingdom). See
generally C. GRUNFELD, THE LAW OF REDUNDANCY, ch. 5 (1980).
The European Community has adopted the term but defines it in relation to the number of
employees to be laid off in an establishment. See infra note 36.
34. Council Directive of 17 February 1975 on the approximation of laws of the Member States
relating to collective redundancies, 75/129/EEC, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 48) 29 (1975) [here-
inafter cited as Directive 75/129].
35. See supra text accompanying notes 22-26.
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measure the Community has adopted to unify employment policy throughout the
Member States. The Directive provides that, in the event of collective redundan-
cies, 36 the representative of the affected workers must be notified thirty days in
advance of dismissal.37 In addition, the employer must consult with workers'
representatives when contemplating redundancies.38 The consultations must in-
clude ways and means of avoiding or reducing redundancies and ways of mitigat-
ing their effects.39 The Directive also requires the employer to notify the proper
public authority thirty days before the dismissals take effect. 40 Member States are
not prohibited from passing legislation more favorable to workers. 41
The adoption of Directive 75/129 was a significant first step toward harmoniza-
tion of Community employment policy. By requiring Member States to stat-
utorily mandate that an employer consult with his or her employees and notify the
state of impending redundancies, the Community asserted its authority to ap-
proximate laws relating to the terms and conditions of employment. Directive
75/129 is the first to recognize that social issues such as employment security
meet the criterion set forth in Article 100 of "directly affect[ing] the establish-
ment or functioning of the common market."
42
Directive 75/129 increases the responsibility of both the state and the employer
when mass dismissals are threatened. Its requirements are not, however, as far-
reaching as they might have been or as far-reaching as those in the draft first
promulgated by the Commission. 43 The initial proposal called for compulsory
consultations with employee representatives, compulsory notification of public
authorities, and for powers on the part of public authorities to postpone or
prohibit dismissals." Extensive disagreement between the Member States re-
36. Directive 75/129, supra note 34, at art. I. Directive 75/129 defines collective redundancies in
relation to the percentage of the labor force that is to be laid off. It applies in establishments normally
employing 20 to 100 workers if the employer dismisses 10 or more workers within 30 days. In
establishments with 100 to 300 employees, it applies if the employer dismisses 10 percent of the work
force within 30 days. In establishments employing 300 or more workers, Directive 75/129 applies if
the employer dismisses 30 workers within 30 days. In addition, Directive 75/129 applies to any
employer who dismisses 20 or more employees within 90 days. The Directive does not apply to
establishments employing less than 20 workers. Employees contracted for a limited time, public
employees, crews of sea going vessels, and workers affected by termination of an establishment's
activities where that is the result of a judicial decision are not protected by Directive 75/129. See id.
37. Directive 75/129, supra note 34, at art. 3(2).
38. Directive 75/129, supra note 34, at art. 2(1).
39. Directive 75/129, supra note 34, at art. 2(2). In order for the employee representatives to
effectively participate, Directive 75/129 requires the employer to provide in writing the reasons for
the redundancies, the number of employees to be made redundant, the number of employees normally
employed at the establishment, and the time period over which the redundancies are to be effected.
See id. at art. 2(3).
40. Directive 75/129, supra note 34, at art. 4. The public authority is required to seek solutions to
the problems raised by the projected collective redundancies. Id.
41. Directive 75/129, supra note 34, at art. 5.
42. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, at art. 100.
43. See Freedland, Employment Protection: Redundancy Procedures and the EEC, 5 INDUS. L.J.
4, 27 (1976).
44. Comm'n of the European Communities, Draft directive of the Council concerning the harmo-
nization of Member States' legislation relating to collective dismissal, 4 BULL. INST. LAB. REL. 205,
208-210 (1973).
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suited in a final draft which eliminated the right of Member States to forbid
dismissals, leaving the Member States in an advisory capacity only.
In its final form Directive 75/129 grants procedural rights to workers caught in
a redundancy situation but is void of substantive standards. The employer must
consult with the employee representatives but the Directive does not contain
provisions which ensure that the discussions will be fruitful. Although consulta-
tion must be with a "view towards reaching an agreement," 45 Directive 75/129
does not require the employer and the employee representatives to reach an
agreement. Nor does the Directive state who represents the employees or how the
representatives are to be chosen. Moreover, Directive 75/129 permits the em-
ployer rather than the employees to choose the representatives. Once consultation
has taken place, neither the employer nor the employee representatives are re-
quired to inform the affected employees of the impending dismissal. Since Mem-
ber States cannot prohibit redundancies, the state has no leverage over the
employer. As a result, the Directive provides the employer with no incentive to
make concessions regarding redundancy benefits or retraining opportunities.
Similarly, the state is not required to take an active role in the redundancy
process. The state receives notification and must seek solutions to the problems
raised by projected collective redundancies. 46 Yet, Directive 75/129 does not
guide the Member States as to what types of actions should be taken or what
solutions might be appropriate. Directive 75/129 does not require Member States
to guarantee that selection for dismissal will be carried out equitably or that
redundant workers will be compensated. The state may not forbid dismissals and
the Directive does not indicate what type of planning should be undertaken when
redundancies are imminent.
Thus, although Directive 75/129 approximates the consultation procedure used
to handle collective redundancies, it fails to create a Community policy for
handling redundancies. It establishes the right of both Member States and the
Community to be concerned about redundancies but does not set guidelines for
the resolution of a redundancy situation.
1. Implementation in the FRG
As with much Community legislation, the Directive on collective redundan-
cies is modelled after statutes which have previously been adopted in one or more
Member States. In this instance the Directive is based on statutes previously
enacted in the FRG.47 Under West German law, the Works Constitution Act48 and
45. Directive 75/129, supra note 34, at art. 2(1).
46. Directive 75/129, supra note 34, at art. 4(2).
47. Consultation of the Economic and Social Committee on a proposal for a Council Directive on
the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to collective dismissals, 16 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. C 100) 11, 14 (1973).
48. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [BetrVG], 1972 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] 113 (FRG). Translations
appear in: 1) FEDERAL MINISTER OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, CO-DETERMINATION IN THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 103 (INT'L LAB. ORG. trans. 1980); 2) German Works Council Act
1972 (CCH) (1972); 3) INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH UNIT, THE WHARTON SCHOOL, UNIVERSITY OF
PENNSYLVANIA, SHOP CONSTITUTION LAW OF JAN. 15, 1972 (1976). The 1972 Act substantially
revised the 1952 Works Constitution Act. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [BetrVG], 1952 BGBI 1681.
Translation appears in: THE FEDERAL MINISTER OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, supra, at 93.
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the Protection Against Dismissals Act49 work together to provide protections
similar to those implemented by Directive 75/129.
Although Directive 75/129 necessitated minor revisions to the Protection
Against Dismissals Act, when viewed in its entirety, the law of the FRG requires
more from an employer than does Directive 75/129.50 According to the Works
Constitution Act, the employer must consult with the employee representatives to
the Works Council5 before every termination decision.52 In addition, the West
German statutes presume that the dismissal of an employee who has worked at
least six months for an employer is socially unjustified.5 3 In order to effectuate a
dismissal the employer must provide the Works Council with the reason for the
dismissal.5 4 If the reason does not meet the standards established by law or
guidelines previously adopted with the consent of the employees at the plant, the
dismissal is not justified. 55 The employer has the burden of proving that the
dismissal is justified.
49. Kundigungsschutzgesetz [KSchG], 1969 BGBI 11317. The 1969 Act substantially revised the
1951 Protection against Dismissals Act. KSchG, 1951 BGBI 1 499.
50. See KSchG (1969), supra note 49. The Protection against Dismissals Act was amended in
1978. KSchG, 1978 BGBI 1 550. It now provides that an employer must notify the employment office
before dismissing five workers from a plant normally employing 20 to 60 workers, 10 percent of the
workforce or at least 25 workers from a plant normally employing 50 to 500 workers, or 30 workers
from a plant normally employing at least 500 workers. KSchG, 1978 BGBI 1 550 at § 1. See
Marschall, Neuregelung der Anzeigepflicht bei "Massenentlassungen," DER BETRIEB 981 (19. Mai
1978). Cf. note 36 (defining the number of employees which must be dismissed for Directive 75/129 to
apply).
51. Works councils are an established institution in the FRG. The first works council was estab-
lished by law in 1920, Betriebsritegesetz [BRG], Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBII 147 (4. Februar 1920)
(Plant Council Act), to represent employee interests in labor and social affairs arising in the work-
place. The procedure was abolished with the rise of the Nazi State in 1933, but was reinstituted in
some industries after the FRG was established in 1949. See Gesetz fiber die Mitbestimmung der
Arbeitnehmer in den Aufsichtraten und Vorstanden der Untemehmen des Bergbaus und der Eisen und
Stahl erzeugenden Industrie, 1951 BGBI 1 347. (Co-determination Law for the Coal, Iron and Steel
Industries). Translation appears in: THE FEDERAL MINISTER OF LABOUR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, supra
note 48, at 73. See also BetrVG (1952), supra note 48. See generally Richardi, Worker Participation
in Decisions Within Undertakings in the Federal Republic of Germany, 5 COMP. LAB. L. 23, 23-31
(1982).
The 1972 Works Council Act expanded the role of the works council in West German industry. See
BetrVG (1972), supra note 48. The works council functions at the plant level. Its members are elected
to three year terms, BetrVG (1972), supra note 48, at § 21, by secret vote. BetrVG (1972), supra note
48, at § 14(l). The number of representatives varies according to the number of employees working at
the plant. BetrVG (1972), supra note 48, at § 9. In addition to its role in the hiring, firing and transfer
of employees, the works council negotiates with management on wage and salary issues, occupa-
tional safety and health matters, and is kept informed on general matters having to do with operation
of the plant. BetrVG (1972), supra note 48, at § 87. For an overview of the works council in West
German labor law, see G. MURG & J. Fox, 2 LABOR RELATIONS LAW 740-833 (1978); Ramm,
Federal Republic of Germany, in 5 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA FOR LABOUR LAW AND INDUS-
TRIAL RELATIONS 168-191 (R. Blanpain ed. 1979).
52. BetrVG (1972), supra note 48, at § 102(I).
53. KSchG (1969), supra note 49, at § 1, as amended BetrVG (1972), supra note 48, at § 123.
54. BetrVG (1972), supra note 48, at § 102(1).
55. BetrVG (1972), supra note 48, at § 95. The employer and the works council must jointly adopt
guidelines for selecting personnel who are to be hired, transferred, regrouped or dismissed. BetrVG
(1972), supra note 48, at § 95(1). In plants with more than 1,000 employees, the works council may
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When a dismissal is based on urgent operational requirements, the burden of
proof shifts and the employee must establish that the dismissal is not justified. 
5 6
The employer, however, must continue to follow all guidelines previously agreed
to between it and the employees, and must meet all other standards provided by
law. Worker demands for a suitable explanation by the employer are supported by
the threat of settlement by a mediation committee57 or an action in a labor court. 5 8
The powers of the Department of Employment in the FRG are virtually identi-
cal to those envisioned by Directive 75/129. 59 The employer must notify the
Department of Employment four weeks before the redundancies are scheduled to
take place if five or more employees are involved. 6 The Department of Employ-
ment reviews the information and determines when the layoff is to become
effective. The Department of Employment may not prohibit dismissals but may
delay them until two months after it has received notification. 6,
The most effective protections against dismissal are provided through con-
sultations with the Works Council rather than with the Department of Employ-
ment. The employer must follow established guidelines and must specifically
show that retraining, transfer, or modification of the contractual arrangement is
not possible, even when the dismissals are carried out for urgent operational
requirements. Since these protections are not embodied in Directive 75/129, it is
unlikely that implementation of the Directive in other Member States will provide
protections equivalent to those existing in the FRG.
2. Implementation in the United Kingdom
The government of the United Kingdom strongly opposed the adoption of
Directive 75/129, and at one stage of the discussions vetoed the entire proposal.
62
Nevertheless, once Directive 75/129 was adopted by the Council, the United
Kingdom enacted the Employment Protection Act of 1975 to comply with the
demand that these guidelines stipulate the qualifications, personal conditions and social aspects which
are to be taken into account. BetrVG, supra note 48, at § 95(2).
See also BetrVG (1972), supra note 48, at § 102(3). The works council may object to a dismissal if:
I) the employer did not sufficiently consider social aspects; 2) the employer did not follow guidelines
stipulated to under § 95; 3) the employee could be transferred to a different job in the same plant or in
another plant of the company; 4) the employer could retrain the employee; or 5) further employment
is possible under modified contract terms and the employee has agreed thereto.
56. KSchG (1969), supra note 49, at § 1(3). Rationalization measures are included in this category.
See A. HUECK, K0NDIGUNGSSCHUTZGESETZ, KOMMENTAR 104-105 (9th ed. 1974).
57. KSchG (1969), supra note 49, at § 76.
58. But cf KSchG (1969), supra note 49, at § 9 (A labor court may award an improperly dismissed
employee damages but not reinstatement.).
59. France and the Netherlands grant the state more extensive authority to prohibit dismissals than
does the FRG. See Hepple, The Protection of Workers against Dismissal, 14 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
489, 492 (1977). The protections in the FRG, by contrast, focus on negotiations between the em-
ployer and the employees rather than on direct state intervention.
60. KSchG (1969), supra note 49, at § 17. Cf Directive 75/129, supra note 34, at art. 1 (requiring
30 days notification before dismissals may take effect).
61. Special restrictions prohibit the dismissal of handicapped workers and pregnant women in most
circumstances. See Schwerbeschadigte Gesetz [SchwerbeschG] §§ 14-18, 1961 BGBI 1 1233; Mat-
terschutz Gesetz [MuSchG], § 9, 1968 BGBI I 315.
62. See Freedland, supra note 43, at 27.
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Directive's requirements. 63 Although the British legislation complies with the
letter of the law, it enacts only the minimum standards required by Directive
75/129. 64
The British statute fails to carry out the intent of Directive 75/129 in several
ways. First, the provisions enacted by the Employment Protection Act make it
unlikely that the consultation between the employees and the employer will be
effective. The Act requires the employer to consult with an official trade union
representative.65 If there is no trade union, the consultation requirement does not
apply.66 If the employer consults with a representative of the employees, the
statute does not require that the two parties actually negotiate to reach a compro-
mise. 67 Mailing the union a notice of impending dismissals fulfills the consulta-
tion requirement. 68 As a result, employers are generally not interested in
compromise or in seeking the alternatives envisioned by Directive 75/129.
The statute also fails to grant the state the authority to properly plan for
redundancies. The employer must notify the Secretary of State at least thirty days
before the dismissals are to take effect, 69 unless it is "not reasonably practicable"
for the employer to do so. 70 The statute gives no guidance as to what might or
might not be reasonably practicable. Once notified, the Secretary of State is not
required to seek solutions. Even if the Secretary of State would like to resolve the
issue, the Secretary does not have the authority or bargaining power to do so. The
statute does not grant the Secretary of State the authority to delay the contem-
plated redundancies.
Finally, the entire consultation and notification procedure required by the
statute may be avoided if there is a collective bargaining procedure which estab-
lishes a satisfactory alternative. 7' The statute does not require the alternative
procedure to be as favorable to individual employees. This provision can be used
63. Employment Protection Act, 1975, Part IV, §§ 99-107 (United Kingdom). The provisions of
the Employment Protection Act do not extend to Northern Ireland. Id. at § 129(6).
64. If a Member State does not implement the provisions of a directive it may be sued by the
Commission. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, at art. 169. Such a suit was brought against Italy for
failure to implement Directive 75/129, supra note 34. See Commission of the European Communities
v. Italian Republic, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2133, 35 Common Mkt. L. Rep. No. 3, at 468 (1982).
65. Employment Protection Act, supra note 63, at § 99(1).
66. Employment Protection Act, supra note 63, at § 99(2) (restricting the employer to consultation
with "an official or other person authorised to carry on collective bargaining with the employer in
question by that trade union").
67. Employment Protection Act, supra note 63, at § 99(8). See also GRUNFELD, supra note 33, at
39-47 (arguing that, although consultation and negotiation are closely related, "[i]n the case of
negotiation, management's commitment to achieving an agreed outcome is undoubtedly greater than
in the case of consultation only." Id. at 43.).
68. Employment Protection Act, supra note 63, at § 99(6). The Act sets forth how the information
is to be conveyed. A face-to-face meeting is not required.
69. Employment Protection Act, supra note 63, at § 100(1). The original notification period was 60
days. A 30 day notification period was introduced in 1979 as a concession to employers by The
Employment Protection (Handling of Redundancies) Variation Order 1979, Stat. Inst. 1979 No. 958
(United Kingdom), noted in GRUNFELD, supra note 33, at 34, n.51. If more than 100 employees are to
be laid off, the employer must notify the Secretary of State at least 90 days before the dismissals take
effect. Employment Protection Act, supra note 63, at § 100(l).
70. Employment Protection Act, supra note 63, at § 100(6).
71. Employment Protection Act, supra note 63, at § 107.
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by unions to bargain away the individual's right to consultation in return for
additional union rights. 
7 2
3. The Impact of Directive 75/129
The effects of Directive 75/129 are largely symbolic. The Directive imposes a
consultation procedure that involves both employees and the State but does not
include guidelines necessary to guarantee employees substantive rights. The
Directive follows the West German model but does not incorporate its more
farsighted provisions. The West German statute is forceful because of the strong
bargaining position of the Works Council, the statutory requirement that the
employer seek alternatives to dismissing employees, and the continued participa-
tion of employees in plant decisions.
None of these provisions appear in Directive 75/129 or in the British statute
implementing the Directive. Moreover, the British statute leaves individual em-
ployees without a forum for objecting to dismissals or a means of ensuring that
dismissals are equitably enacted. As a result, Directive 75/129 can have little
impact on Community workers.
Directive 75/129 signifies the Community's increased interest in the need of
employees for security in terms and conditions of employment. It also demon-
strates the Community's hesitancy to impinge upon the ability of enterprises to
implement structural changes. With Directive 75/129 the Community has at-
tempted to approximate the laws of the Member States in one narrow area of
employment policy. The Community has also taken a small step towards reform.
The Directive's applicability is, however, confined to a limited set of circum-
stances and does not permit the development of a Community plan for industrial
development.
B. The Directive on the Transfer of Undertakings
Two years after enactment of Directive 75/129, the Community adopted a
second directive increasing the rights of Community workers. Directive 77/187
grants workers rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts
of businesses.73 Like Directive 75/129, Directive 77/187 is based on Articles 100
and 117 of the Treaty of Rome.
74
Directive 77/187 goes beyond Directive 75/129 in that it grants employees both
procedural and substantive rights. When a transfer takes place, the transferee
automatically takes on all rights and obligations arising from the employment
72. The Secretary of State may approve an alternative procedure only if all parties to the agreement
approve the procedure. Since individual employees are not a party in a collective bargaining agree-
ment, their approval is not required. See Employment Protection Act, supra note 63, at § 107.
73. Council directive of 14 February 1977 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States
relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses
or parts of businesses, 77/187/EEC, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 61) 26 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Directive 77/187].
74. See supra text accompanying notes 22-26.
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relationship of the previous employer and his or her employees. 75 The transferee
must continue to observe collective bargaining agreements between the employ-
ees and the transferor. 76 Member States may further provide that the transferor
will continue to be liable for obligations arising from the employment rela-
tionship. 77
A second substantive right granted by Directive 77/187 is a prohibition against
dismissals. The Directive forbids the transfer or merger of an undertaking from
constituting grounds for dismissal. 78 This provision expands the protection
granted to employees in Member States against dismissal without just cause.79
The protection is limited since Directive 77/187 states that the provision does not
prevent dismissals for economic, technical, or organizational reasons.80 As a
result, when a transfer takes place, the employees automatically retain their jobs.
As soon as the new employer implements rationalization measures, however, the
employees are no longer protected.
Directive 77/187 also grants employees procedural rights. Both the transferor
and the transferee must inform the employee representatives of the reasons for the
transfer, the legal, economic, and social implications of the transfer for the
employees, and the measures envisaged in relation to the employees.8' The
employees must receive this information "in good time" before the transfer is
carried out, or at least before they are directly affected by the transfer.82 The
extent of this right is not explicitly stated in the Directive. It will vary since
Member States are free to define the terms and adopt whatever procedures they
wish to implement the Directive's requirements.
Directive 77/187 attempts to balance the conflict between the interests of
business and workers. It recognizes the necessity for the transfer of undertakings
and seeks to implement rules that will permit transfers to take place in an orderly
fashion. On the other hand, the Directive is evidence of the Community's con-
cern that if proper protections are not implemented, workers alone will bear the
brunt of the changing Community economy. "
75. Directive 77/187, supra note 73, at art. 3(1)[1].
76. Directive 77/187, supra note 73, at art. 3(2)[1]. Butcf Directive 77/187, supra note 73, at art.
3(2)[2] (permitting Member States to limit the period for observing such terms and conditions to a
period of not less than one year).
77. Directive 77/187, supra note 73, at art. 3(t)[2].
78. Directive 77/187, supra note 73, at art. 4(1).
79. All Member States have legislation protecting workers from discharge without just cause. See
International Dismissal and redundancy pay in 10 countries, EUR. INDUS. REL. REV., April 1980, at
14.
80. Directive 77/187, supra note 73, at art. 4(1).
81. Directive 77/187, supra note 73, at art. 6(l)[1].
82. Directive 77/187, supra note 73, at art. 6(l)[2 & 3].
83. See Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 255) 25, 26
(1975). General comment 1.2 states:
The Committee reaffirms ... that a merger, takeover or amalgamation is the right course in
some circumstances, subject to certain criteria laid down in the interests of the Community
economy and the interests of employees .... [T]he Committee believes that many harmful
consequences for the workers could be forestalled if the implications of reorganization opera-
tions for the workers were considered carefully well before the operations were actually
carried out. For it can happen that while such operations may be very beneficial for the
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It is doubtful that the balance sought by the Directive will be obtained. In most
situations, businesses undergo significant technical or organizational changes
when a transfer takes place. Since Directive 77/187 provides no protection in this
situation, its provisions are largely illusory.
1. Implementation in the FRG
As with Directive 75/129, implementation of Directive 77/187 in the FRG did
not involve major statutory changes. Since 1972 the FRG has held the transferee
liable for all the rights and obligations arising out of the employment relationship
between the transferor and the employees. 14 Collective bargaining agreements
must be honored by the new employer for one year. 5 In addition, the normal
dismissal procedures of the plant must be observed, ensuring that the new em-
ployer considers alternatives such as retraining or transfer before dismissing
employees. 8 6 These provisions guarantee West German workers rights similar to
those envisioned in Directive 77/187.
Prior to the adoption of Directive 77/187 the FRG also enacted legislation
guaranteeing information and consultation rights regarding major operational
changes. These provisions go beyond the requirements of Directive 77/187. The
Works Council Act of 1972 established an Economic Committee in plants with
100 or more employees.87 The Economic Committee is entitled to information
and consultation in a variety of areas including the economic and financial
situation of the company, rationalization plans, the merger of plants, and any
other event or plan which may affect the employees of the company."8 In addi-
tion, the Works Council is entitled to receive advance information concerning all
profitabililty of the companies, the adverse effects are borne by the workers alone. The
Committee accordingly attaches special importance to this Commission proposal, as it does to
all Community proposals designed to prevent or compensate for damage inflicted on workers.
The present proposal aims to ensure that workers alone do not bear the cost of achieving
technological progress or alone make the sacrifices that may be necessary in the short run to
achieve improved living standards in the longer run. (emphasis added).
84. Burgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGBI § 613a, as amended by BetrVG (1972), supra note 48, at §
122.
[I] When a plant or part of a plant passes by legal transaction to another owner, that owner
shall take on the rights and duties of the employments existing at the time of the transfer.
[I1] The previous employer and the new owner shall be jointly and severally liable for
obligations in accordance with Subsec. I insofar as they arose prior to the time of the transfer
and become due prior to the expiration of one year after that time. If such obligations become
due after the time of the transfer, the previous employer shall be liable for them only to the
extent that corresponds to the part of their assessment period prior to the time of the transfer.
[III] Subsec. 2 shall not be applicable if a juridical person ceases to exist because of merger
or reorganization ...
85. Id. at § 613a[I1.
86. BetrVG (1972), supra note 48, at § 102.
87. BetrVG (1972), supra note 48, at §§ 106-110.
88. BetrVG (1972), supra note 48, at § 106(3). The employer must fully inform and consult with
the Economic Committee about the economic affairs of the plant, including the "merger of plants"
and "other events and plans which may appreciably affect the interests of the employees of a
company." Id.
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changes which might have a detrimental effect on the employees. 8 9 The statutory
provision does not specifically refer to the transfer of an undertaking. The re-
quired consultations cover, however, virtually all situations where Directive
77/187 would apply.
Thus, it is evident that, prior to the adoption of Directive 77/187, the FRG
protected workers in the event of a transfer of an undertaking. These protections
are provided by a complex set of procedures backed up by statutory provisions
guaranteeing workers certain presumptions and rights. Since Directive 77/187
requires Member States to enact only a portion of this comprehensive program, it
is doubtful that the protections guaranteed in the FRG will be guaranteed to
workers in other Member States. Moreover, Directive 77/187 neither broadens the
scope of rights which West German workers possess nor creates a mechanism for
the development of a Community-wide policy.
2. Implementation in the United Kingdom
Despite the ambivalent language of Directive 77/187 with regard to structural
change upon the transfer of an enterprise, the Directive necessitated substantial
changes in the United Kingdom's employment protection laws. It required altera-
tion of the common law rule that an employment contract is personal and there-
fore automatically terminated when management changes.
Compliance with the requirements of Directive 77/187 was slowed by the
change in government administration in 1979.90 Only in 1981, two years after the
deadline for adopting provisions complying with the provisions of the Direc-
tive, 9' were The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regula-
tions promulgated. 92 The regulations implement the minimum measures
necessary to comply with Directive 77/187. 91
The regulations effectuating Directive 77/187 state that the transfer of an
undertaking will not terminate a contract of employment 94 and that collective
89. BetrVG (1972), supra note 48, at § 111. Changes which might have a detrimental effect are
defined as follows: "1. reduction and shutdown of the entire plant or essential parts thereof; 2.
relocation of the entire plant or essential parts thereof; 3. merger with other plants; 4. fundamental
changes in the plant's organization or objective or of the plant facilities; 5. introduction of basically
new work methods and manufacturing processes." Id.
90. See Elias, The Transfer of Undertakings: A Reluctantly Acquired Right, 3 COMPANY LAW. 147
(1982); Hepple, The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations, 11 INDUS.
L.J. 29 (1982). In 1979, the Conservative Party came to power in Great Britain. The Conservatives
were far less enthusiastic about Directive 77/187 than was the Labour Party. Directive 77/187 was
finally implemented in 1982, more than three years after the expiration of the two year grace period.
The impetus for adoption of the regulations was the Commission's decision to bring suit against the
United Kingdom for failing to implement the provisions of Directive 77/187. See Elias, supra, at 147;
Hepple, supra, at 29.
91. Member States were granted a two year grace period, until February 14, 1979, to adopt laws,
regulations, or administrative provisions complying with Directive 77/187. Directive 77/187, supra
note 73, at art. 8(l).
92. Stat. Inst. 1981 No. 1794 (United Kingdom).
93. See Elias, supra note 90; Hepple, supra note 90. Hepple maintains that "[a]rguably, the
Regulations are not in full compliance with the spirit and intent of the Directive." Hepple, supra note
90, at 29.
94. Stat. Inst. 1981 No. 1794, supra note 92, at § 5(1).
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bargaining agreements will have the same effect as if the transferee were a party
to the agreement. 95 Where an employee is dismissed either before or after the
relevant transfer, the regulations presume that the dismissal was unfair unless
economic, technical, or organizational reasons were the principal reasons for the
dismissal. 96 The regulations also impose a duty on the employer to inform and
consult with trade union representatives prior to the dismissal. 97 Like the Em-
ployment Protection Act of 1975, the regulations are weakened by a provision
exempting employers from this duty insofar as notification and consultation are
not reasonably practicable. 9 Even when the failure to consult is adjudicated
unreasonable, the regulations impose only a small penalty. 99 Thus, the exceptions
to the regulations and the absence of an enforcement mechanism lessen their
impact.
It is doubtful that the procedural right to information and consultation in
advance of a transfer will have a significant impact on corporations doing busi-
ness in the United Kingdom. As with Directive 75/129, the procedural require-
ments do not in themselves strengthen the rights of the employees. The success of
the employees in obtaining concessions from the employer continues to depend
largely upon the bargaining strength of the unions. 10
3. The Impact of Directive 77/187
Directive 77/187 represents a second attempt to harmonize the laws of the
Member States for the express purpose of improving the working conditions and
standard of living for Community workers. Here again the Community has
attempted unsuccessfully to extend protections to Community workers which are
already enjoyed by workers in the FRG.
Directive 77/187 goes beyond Directive 75/129 in that it contains substantive as
well as procedural requirements. As with Directive 75/129, it directly intervenes
in a narrow issue concerning the rights of Community workers, and imposes
specific duties. Directive 77/187 does not attempt to create a policy that is
applicable throughout the Community or to regulate employee rights upon the
transfer of an undertaking at the Community level.
Although the language of Directive 77/187 appears to grant Community work-
ers significant rights, such is not the case. As demonstrated by the case of the
United Kingdom, the implementation process in the Member States can ensure
95. Stat. Inst. 1981 No. 1794, supra note 92, at § 6(a) (establishing that rights and obligations
negotiated by a recognized trade union are transferred to the new employer).
Because collective agreements are generally unenforceable under British law and the regulations
do not alter this presumption, the new rights can have little effect. See Trade Union and Labour
Relations Act, 1974, § 18 (United Kingdom).
96. Stat. Inst. 1981 No. 1794, supra note 92, at § 8.
97. Stat. Inst. 1981 No. 1794, supra note 92, at § 10.
98. Stat. Inst. 1981 No. 1794, supra note 92, at § 10(7).
99. Stat. Inst. 1981 No. 1794, supra note 92, at § I1. The employee may be awarded up to two
weeks pay. This amount will then be deducted from any redundancy payment or other remuneration
due the employee. Id.
100. See generally Hepple, Community Measures for the Protection of Workers Against Dismissal,
14 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 489 (1977) (exploring the potential impact of Directives 75/129 and 77/187
in the United Kingdom).
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that a directive does little to reform or even harmonize the laws of a Member
State.
An examination of the implementation process of Directive 77/187 also brings
to light the political compromises that take place at the Community level when a
directive is adopted. The implementation of Directive 77/187 demonstrates how
the Community has been unable to resolve the conflict between the promotion of
structural change and the rationalization of industries, and the desire to ensure
that workers benefit from technological progress. The Directive sends contradic-
tory messages to the Member States regarding both the extent to which workers
should be protected when an undertaking is transferred, and the role which the
Community seeks to play in the area of employment policy.
III. PROPOSALS FOR THE HARMONIZATION OF WORKER PARTICIPATION
Parallel to the trend granting employees rights in a redundancy situation, a
movement to increase the role of employees in the management of the enterprise
has emerged. Rather than focusing on specific instances when the security of
workers may be threatened, worker participation proposals attempt to grant Com-
munity workers consultation and negotiation rights at top levels of corporate
decision making. By providing a forum for discussions among workers and by
increasing the interaction between workers and management, the Commission
hopes to empower workers in the daily functioning of the enterprise. '0' The
Commission believes that participation will increase industry's abililty to adopt
substantial structural changes with the consent and understanding of its workers,
thus reducing the potential for conflict. 102 If these proposals are adopted, Direc-
tives 75/129 and 77/187 might no longer be necessary. Employees would be
involved in corporate decision making throughout the entire process rather than
just before dismissals take place.
Despite the hopes of the Commission, none of the worker participation pro-
posals discussed in this note have been adopted by the Council. Vigorous opposi-
tion has arisen from a variety of sources, including the government of the United
Kingdom. 103 This opposition has arisen because the proposals are so extensive.
Their adoption would require significant changes in the laws of most Member
States.
The three proposals to be discussed briefly in this part are: the Statute for a
European Company; the Fifth Directive to coordinate the laws of Member States
regarding the structure of public limited companies; and the Vredeling proposal
on employee information and consulting procedures. All three proposals would
involve employees in top level management decisions affecting employees
throughout the Community.
101. See,- e.g., THE GREEN PAPER, supra note 4, at 9.
102. See THE GREEN PAPER, supra note 4, at 9.
103. See infra notes 145-146, 159-161 and accompanying text.
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A. The Statute for a European Company
The earliest Community proposal providing for worker participation in man-
agement is the proposed Statute for a European Company. 104 It was presented by
the Commission to the Council in 1970 as a regulation based on Article 235 of the
Treaty of Rome. 05 A revised version was published in 1975.106 If adopted, the
Statute would create a comprehensive framework for the incorporation of an
enterprise at a Community rather than national level.
The Statute requires extensive employee participation in the functioning of the
enterprise. It proposes that one-third of the representatives to the supervisory
board be employees of the company and one-third be shareholders, with the
remainder to be jointly elected by the two groups. 107 In addition, it provides for
the establishment of a European Works Council 08 which would be responsible
for representing the interests of the employees at an international level. 109 The
proposal grants the European Works Council broad information and consultation
rights, " 0 and requires management to obtain the Council's approval before im-
plementing rules relating directly to the employees."' In order to protect local
groups of employees, the Statute for a European Company provides that the
activities of the European Works Council may not conflict with collective bar-
gaining agreements covering purely national matters." 2
104. COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL REGULATION EM-
BODYING A STATUTE FOR EUROPEAN COMPANIES, BULL. EUR. COMM. SUPP. 8/70 (1970).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
106. COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL REGULATION ON THE
STATUTE FOR EUROPEAN COMPANIES, BULL. EUR. COMM. SUPP. 4/75 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
STATUTE FOR A EUROPEAN COMPANY]. The changes take into account the opinions of the European
Parliament, 17 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 93) 22 (1974) and the Economic and Social Committee 15
J.O. EUR. COMM. (No. C 131) 32 (1972). Changes were also necessitated by the entry of the United
Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark into the Community. See generally Pipkorn, Employee Participation
in the European Company, 8 BULL. COMP. LAB. REL. 23 (1977).
107. STATUTE FOR A EUROPEAN COMPANY, supra note 106, at art. 74a(l).
108. STATUTE FOR A EUROPEAN COMPANY, supra note 106, at arts. 100-129.
109. STATUTE FOR A EUROPEAN COMPANY, supra note 106, at art. 119.
110. STATUTE FOR A EUROPEAN COMPANY, supra note 106, at arts. 120-127.
111. STATUTE FOR A EUROPEAN COMPANY, supra note 106, at art. 123(1) provides:
Decisions concerning the following matters may be made by the Board of Management
only with the agreement of the European Works Council:
a) rules relating to recruitment, promotion and dismissal of employees;
b) implementation of vocational training;
c) fixing of terms of remuneration and introduction of new methods of computing re-
muneration;
d) measures relating to industrial safety, health and hygiene;
e) introduction and management of social facilities;
f) the establishment of general criteria for the daily times of commencement and termina-
tion of work;
g) the establishment of general criteria for preparing holiday schedules.
112. STATUTE FOR A EUROPEAN COMPANY, supra note 106, at art. 119(2) provides:
The competence of the European Works Council shall extend to matters which concern
more than one establishment not located in the same Member State and which cannot be
settled by the national employees' representative bodies acting within their own establishment.
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Although commentators agree that some form of employee participation on
supervisory boards is advisable,'13 there is disagreement as to the best form of
employee participation within the European Company. 114 The current proposal
permits the employees to approve two-thirds of the representatives to the super-
visory board. The result is a governing board on which employee representatives
would have a major impact and would often provide the decisive votes in decision
making. "I
The establishment of a European Works Council would alter the employment
relationship for corporations established under the Statute. The Works Council's
transnational focus would facilitate communication between labor organizations
in different Member States and encourage multinational collective bargaining.
This would give employees an incentive to overcome national divisions and
oppose corporate flight to countries outside the Community. The existence of the
Works Council would also lessen competition between Member States for plants
and jobs. Structural changes affecting workers could be agreed upon at a Com-
munity level, based upon input from workers throughout the Community.
In theory, adoption of the Statute for a European Company would promote
corporate mobility throughout the Community. It would free a corporation from
many legal intricacies of transnational operations since the corporation would no
longer have to comply with, the corporation code of each Member State. "16 The
Statute would directly apply to the Member States" 7 and would thus be inter-
preted in the same manner in each Member State. The diverse implementation
possible with Community directives, as exemplified by Directives 75/129 and
77/187, would no longer burden Community corporations. This would lessen the
financial and legal burden on transnational corporations and permit these corpo-
rations to move freely throughout the Community.
Despite the potential benefits of a corporation code that is applicable through-
out the Community, several Member States oppose the proposed Statute. The
progressive features of the Statute such as the transparent corporate structure it
Matters shall not fall within the competence of the European Works Council in so far as they
are settled by collective agreement.
The European Works Council may not conclude agreements nor conduct negotiations
regarding the working conditions of employees unless a European collective agreement ex-
pressly authorizes the conclusion of supplementary agreements by the European Works
Council.
113. See THE GREEN PAPER, supra note 4, at 21.
114. See generally THE GREEN PAPER, supra note 4.
115. The Statute for a European Company would permit employees greater influence than provided
for in the equivalent West German statute. Cf Mitbestimmunggesetz [MitBG], 1976 BGBI 1 1153
(Codetermination Act). Translations appear in: THE FEDERAL MNISTER OF LABOUR AND SocIAL
AFFAIRs, supra note 48 at 7; and INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH UNIT, THE WHARTON SCHOOL, UNIVER-
SITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 48. The Codetermination Act grants the chairman of the board,
who is elected by management, the tiebreaking vote when there is disagreement. Id. at § 29(2).
116. See COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THE EUROPEAN COMPANY STATUTE: INFOR-
MATION MEMO (1975), reprinted in E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROECK, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 648 (1976).
117. Regulations are directly applicable in the Member States. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 3,
at art. 189.
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requires," 8 and the obligations to shareholders and employees, 119 make Member
States hesitant to support its adoption. If the Statute introduces too many re-
forms, corporations will continue to incorporate under the corporation codes of
the Member States and not under the Statute. Since the Commission does not
have the political clout to require corporations to incorporate under its Statute,
corporations would be left with a choice. They could incorporate under the laws
of their principal place of business or under the Community Statute. Leaving this
choice to the corporation decreases the likelihood of success for the Statute.
The Statute for a European Company is a radical proposal. Its adoption would
strengthen the authority of the Community in matters concerning corporate gov-
ernance. In addition, it would significantly increase the role of Community
workers in corporate decision making. Presently, however, the Statute is not a
realistic proposal. It includes significant reforms that corporations, when given a
choice, will not choose to abide by. If the Statute omits these reforms, it can not
achieve its purpose. It is, therefore, unlikely that the Statute will be implemented
until greater protections are available to employees and shareholders through the
corporation codes of Member States.
B. The Fifth Directive
The Fifth Directive is one of a series of directives, based on Article 54(3)(g) of
the Treaty of Rome, 2 0 which seeks to harmonize the corporate structures of the
Member States. 121 The proposed Fifth Directive reflects the Community's desire
118. The Statute for a European Company includes extensive reporting and publication require-
ments. See STATUTE FOR A EUROPEAN COMPANY, supra note 106, at arts. 148-222.
119. See STATUTE FOR A EUROPEAN COMPANY, supra note 106, at arts. 90 and 120; see also
COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THE EUROPEAN COMPANY STATUTE: INFORMATION
MEMO (1975), reprinted in STEIN, HAY & WAELBROECK, supra note 116, at 650.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
121. Amended Proposal for a Fifth Directive founded on Article 54(3)(g) of the EEC Treaty
concerning the structure of public limited companies and the powers and obligations of their organs,
26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 240) 2 (1983), reprinted and analyzed in COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES, THE STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANIES: AMENDED PROPOSAL FOR A
FIFTH DIRECTIVE,, BULL. EUR. COMM. SUPP. 6/83 (1983) [hereinafter cited as FIFTH DIRECTIVE].
See generally Welch, The Fifth Draft Directive-A False Dawn?, 8 EUR. L. REV. 83 (1983).
The proposal is one of ten directives based on Article 54(3)(g) which seek to harmonize company
structure throughout the Community. The first eight were presented by the Commission to the
Council in the 1960s and early 1970s. All but the Fifth Directive have been adopted. The First
Directive regulates the legal capacity of the company and the publication of information, 68/151/EEC,
11 J.0. EUR. COMM. (No. L 65) 8 (1968); the Second Directive regulates the formation of public
limited companies and the maintenance of capital, 77/91/EEC, 20 0.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 26) 1
(1977), the Third Directive regulates internal mergers between joint stock companies, 78/855/EEC, 21
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L. 295) 36 (1978); the Fourth Directive regulates annual accounts,
78/660/EEC, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 222) 11 (1978); the Sixth Directive regulates the division of
companies, 82/89/EEC, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 378) 47 (1982); the Seventh Directive regulates
group accounts 83/349/EEC, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 193) 1 (1983) and the Eighth Directive
regulates the professional qualifications of auditors of company accounts, 84/253/EEC, COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 1431 (April 10, 1984).
The Ninth Directive will deal with the conduct of groups of companies. It will define parents and
subsidiaries, and their relationship. The Tenth Directive will cover company liquidations. The Com-
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to encourage cross-frontier economic activities" and the need to facilitate trans-
national operations,:23 as well as its interest in promoting employee involvement
in decision making. The greatest obstacle to adoption of the Fifth Directive is the
inability of the Member States to agree upon a type of corporate organization and
a level of employee involvement that would be acceptable throughout the Com-
munity. The draft Fifth Directive has been modified and made more flexible
regarding corporate form and employee involvement. These changes decrease,
however, the likelihood that the Fifth Directive will effectively harmonize the
role of employees in decision making.
The draft presently before the Council sets out two permissible forms of
corporate structure, a two-tiered 12 4 and a one-tiered 25 structure. If the proposal is
adopted, Member States will have to enact laws permitting corporations to incor-
porate with a two-tiered form of corporate structure. 2 6 Member States will also
be permitted to offer corporations the opportunity to incorporate under a one-
tiered system. 127 The requirement that Member States offer the two-tiered system
furthers the goal of harmonization while the one-tiered option allows for the
differing cultural, legal and historical backgrounds of the Member States. 
2
1
The Fifth Directive provides for employee representation under both forms of
mission has not yet submitted an official proposal for either the Ninth or Tenth Directive to the
Council. There is some discussion in the literature regarding the Ninth Directive. See Guyon, Examen
critique des projets europiens en mati~re de groupes de soci~tes (le point de vuefrangais), in GROUPS
OF COMPANIES IN EUROPEAN LAWS 155 (K. Hopt ed. 1982); Schneebaum, The Company Law
Harmonization Program of the European Community, 14 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 293, 317-321
(1982).
122. FIFrH DIRECTIVE, supra note 121, at 20.
123. FIFTH DIRECTIVE, supra note 121, at 22.
124. FIFTH DIRECrIVE, supra note 121, at arts. 3-13. These articles describe the operation and
functioning of the two-tiered system. This form of corporate structure is modelled after the FRG's
Codetermination Act for the Coal and Steel Industry, supra note 51, and the 1976 Codetermination
Act, MitBG, supra note 115.
125. FIFTH DIRECTIVE, supra note 121, at arts. 21a-21t. These articles describe the operation and
functioning of the one-tiered system. The one-tiered system was added to the proposal to make the
Fifth Directive more palatable to Member States such as the United Kingdom whose corporations are
structured with a single corporate board.
The actual structure of the administrative board required by the Fifth Directive is, however, similar
to that required by the two-tiered system. One administrative board, composed of both executive and
non-executive members, id. at art. 21a(l)(a), divides the administrative tasks. The non-executive
members act similarly to members of the supervisory board under the two-tiered system, while the
executive members act similarly to the members of the management board. As a result, Member
States that wish to maintain the one-tiered system would still have to make significant changes in their
corporation laws.
126. FIFTH DIRECTjVE, supra note 121, at art. 2(1).
127. FIFTH DIRECrIVE, supra note 121, at art. 2(1).
128. See, e.g., THE GREEN PAPER, supra note 121. The Green Paper argues that the two-tiered
system is the more efficient and best structure for the harmonization of company law. Id. at 40. It
concludes that the Fifth Directive might stand a greater chance of adoption if it permits incorporation
under the one-tiered system for those Member States which historically have used this system. Id. at
41.
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corporate structure. 129 Four alternative methods of participation are permitted.
The preferred method is through direct participation on the policy-making body
of the corporation. 3 0 Under no circumstances would employees be involved in
the daily management decisions of the corporation.' 3' Nor would they ever pro-
vide the decisive votes in general policy decisions. 32
A second method of participation, which is provided for only when the two-
tiered system of management is used, is through a cooptation process. 33 Under
this system, employees would not elect representatives to the supervisory board.
They would, instead, have an automatic veto power which could be overruled
only if their objection were declared unfounded by an independent organiza-
tion. 14
The Fifth Directive also permits representation through a board composed
solely of employee representatives. 35 This option would be permitted regardless
of whether the one or the two-tiered system were implemented. The board of
employees would not have a formal connection with the administrative or super-
visory board. Nor would it have the right to veto decisions of these boards. It
would, however, possess rights equivalent to those of employees sitting directly
on the supervisory or administrative board. 
36
Additionally, the Fifth Directive allows Member States to adopt legislation
permitting employee participation to be regulated by collective bargaining agree-
ments. 37 The agreement would have to implement procedures analogous to those
required by the other three options. '18 This option adds flexibility to the Fifth
Directive because a collective bargaining agreement could combine the three
129. FiF-rH DIRECTIVE, supra note 121, at arts. 4(2) and 21b(2). Corporations are required to
provide for participation only when the company employs 1,000 or more workers. Id. at arts. 4(2) and
21b(2). The number of workers is determined by including the number of employees working for
subsidiary undertakings. Id. at arts. 4(1) and 21b(1).
130. FIFrH DIRECTIVE, supra note 121, at Preamble. If the two-tiered system is used, one-third to
one-half of the members of the supervisory organ are to be appointed by the employees of the
company. Id. at art. 4b(l). If the one-tiered system is used, one-third to one-half of the non-executive
members of the administative organ are to be appointed by the employees of the company. Id. at art.
21d(l).
131. FIFTH DIRECTIVE, supra note 121, at arts. 3(l)(a) and 21a(l)(a). If the two-tiered system is
used, the management board of the corporation directs the activities of the company. The supervisory
board receives regular reports from the management board, id. at art. 11, makes policy decisions, id.
at art. 12, and determines who shall sit on the management board, id. at arts. 3(1)(b) and 13. If the
one-tiered system is used, the same decisions are made by the executive members of the admin-
istrative board. See id. at arts. 21r, 21s, 21a(l)(b), and 21t(l).
132. FIFTH DIRECTIVE, supra note 121, at arts. 4(b)(2) and 21d(2).
133. FIFrH DIRECTIVE, supra note 121, at art. 4c.
134. FIFTH DIRECTIVE, supra note 121, at art. 4c. The general meeting of shareholders or a
committee of shareholder representatives may object to the appointment of members of the super-
visory board in the same manner as the employees. Id.
135. FiF-rH DIRECTIVE, supra note 121, at arts. 4d and 21e.
136. FiFrt DIRECTIVE, supra note 121, at arts. 4d(l) and 21e(l).
137. FIFTH DIRECTIVE, supra note 121, at arts. 4e and 21f.
138. FIFTH DIRECTIVE, supra note 121, at arts. 4g and 21h.
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procedures for employee representation. "I Member States may also adopt provi-
sions providing that employee participation does not have to be implemented
when a majority of a company's employees oppose participation. 140
In attempting to appease various Member States by creating these options, the
Commission has proposed a directive that does little to approximate the laws of
the Member States. The current proposal provides the Member States with far
more leeway than the proposal that was originally presented to the Council in
1972.141 The initial draft imposed a uniform two-tiered system with only two
alternative forms of participation on the Member States. 142 The current proposal,
which permits Member States to offer both the one and two-tiered forms of
corporate structure, does not harmonize corporate structure in the Member
States. The variety of methods for participation also prevents the harmonization
of corporate structure. Corporations will still have to adjust to different pro-
cedures for employee representation in each Member State.
In the FRG, a country with a long history of state management of industrial
relations, the Fifth Directive would have little effect. 143 Implementation of the
Fifth Directive would, however, force other Member States to adopt standards
similar to those of the FRG. This, in turn, would facilitate transnational opera-
tions and make corporations less hesitant to incorporate under the FRG's re-
strictive code. In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, implementation of the
Fifth Directive would involve major statutory changes. Current British law
makes no provision for employee participation on supervisory boards. The draf-
ters of the proposal currently before the Council have attempted to take into
139. FIFTH DIRECTIVE, supra note 121, at 8.
140. FIFTH DIRECTIVE, supra note 121, at arts. 4(2) and 21b(2).
141. Proposition d'une cinqui~me directive tendant A coordonner les garanties qui sont exigdes
dans les ttats membres, des socidt6s, au sens de ]'article 58 paragraphe 2 du trait6, pour proteger les
inttr~ts, tant des associds que des tiers en ce qui conceme la structure des socidt6s anonymes ainsi que
les pouvoirs et obligations de leurs organes, 15 J.O. EUR. COMM. (No. C 131) 49 (1972), translated
and analyzed in COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, PROPOSAL FOR A FIFTH DIRECTIVE ON
THE STRUCTURE OF SociTt.s ANONYMES, BULL. EUR. COMM. SUP. 10/72 (1972).
France, Italy and the United Kingdom (after it joined the Community in 1973), raised vocal
objections to the proposal. They objected to the required participation of employees within company
structure and to the substantial changes the proposal would require in the structure of national
corporations.
In response to these criticisms, the Commmission published a report in 1975. See THE GREEN
PAPER, supra note 4. The Green Paper emphasized the need for Community legislation in the area and
attempted to raise the issues important for a "constructive debate." id. at 46.
The Green Paper achieved its purpose in that it sparked a lively debate among governments,
employers, trade unions, and scholars. See generally Workers' Participation in Management, 10
BULL. COMp. LAB. REL. 233 (Blanpain, ed. 1979); Conlon, Industrial Democracy and EEC Com-
pany Law: A Review of the Draft Fifth Directive, 24 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 348 (1975); Dauibler, The
Employee Participation Directive-A Realistic Utopia?, 14 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 457 (1977).
142. COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, PROPOSAL FOR A FIFTH DIRECTIVE ON THE
STRUCTURE OF SocIuTs ANONYMES, BULL. EUR. COMM. SUPE. 1/72 (1972) at art. 4(1). The
original proposal called for a supervisory board, two-thirds of whose members would be elected by
shareholders and one-third of whom would be elected by the employees. Id. at art. 4(2). Day to day
management decisions would be made by a management board that was appointed by members of the
supervisory board. Id. at arts. 2(l)(1) and 3(1).
143. See supra note 51.
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account British concerns, 144 but the Fifth Directive has not gained the support of
the government of the United Kingdom. 
45
The extent to which the Fifth Directive will actually increase the role of
Community workers in the management of the enterprise is unclear. Its imple-
mentation might actually decrease the power of unions. If employee interests
have been represented at the initial decision-making stage, it is more difficult for
labor interests to rely upon the adversary relationship between business and labor
to attack management decisions. Employee representatives may feel compelled
to defend management decisions. In addition, the reasoning behind the proposal
presupposes that major corporate decisions affecting the lives of employees are
made at a highly centralized level. Employers claim that this presumption is not
accurate. 46 If the employers are correct, the proposal fails in its attempt to give
workers influence over decisions made by the company.
In any case, adoption of the Fifth Directive would provide Community work-
ers with regularized access to management and the potential to influence corpo-
rate decision making. Although employees would not be able to outvote
management, their input would be obtained during the decision-making process
rather than after the fact. This should facilitate Community-wide planning by
corporations and workers, as well as the flow of information about corporate
activity throughout the Community.
The Community has debated the proposal for a Fifth Directive for over ten
years. The Fifth Directive is an attractive option because it creates a uniform
system and method, providing suitable protections to worker interests, and yet
does not reduce the ability of Member States to regulate corporate activity. 47 The
presentation of the amended version of the Fifth Directive to the Council in July,
1983 rekindled interest in the Fifth Directive. While it is too early to predict the
Council's response to the new proposal for a Fifth Directive, it is clear that the
Fifth Directive continues to face stiff opposition.
C. The Vredeling Proposal
The Vredeling Proposal 141 on employee information and consultation pro-
cedures represents a third attempt to increase the rights of employees in their
144. See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY ON INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY, DEPARTMENT OF
TRADE, CMD. 6706 (1977) (commonly referred to as The Bullock Report). The Bullock Report
undertakes a thorough analysis of the need for and possible effects of worker participation in the
United Kingdom. It favors worker participation as a means of decreasing conflict and increasing
productivity. Specifically, the report recommends a one-tiered system of unitary boards rather than
the two-tiered system used in the FRG. In addition, it recommends that participation be implemented
gradually and only if a sufficient majority of employees indicate that they desire representation. See
id. at 160-162. The amended proposal for a Fifth Directive incorporates this concern by permitting
Member States to allow enterprises to incorporate under a one-tiered system. See FIFrH DIRECTIVE,
supra note 121, at art. 2(1).
145. See United Kingdom: The Participation Debate, EUR. INDUS. REL. REV., March 1984, at 13.
146. See Blanpain, Transnational Regulation of the Labor Relations of Multinational Enterprises,
58 CHI-KENT L. REV. 909, 911-912 (1982).
147. But cf STATUTE FOR A EUROPEAN COMPANY, supra note 106 (delegating control of corporate
activity to the Community).
148. The proposal is named after its proponent, Hendrick Vredeling, former Commissioner for
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jobs. 149 The Proposal addresses issues raised by the increasing number of trans-
national undertakings operating in the Community. The Proposal is based on
Articles 100 and 117 of the Treaty of Rome, 15 0 and builds on policies begun with
Directives 75/129 and 77/187, and the Fifth Directive. I Its supporters argue its
adoption is necessary because the earlier directives do not cover all situations
likely to affect the interests of Community employees. 1
5 2
Implementation of the provisions of the Vredeling Proposal would require
extensive legislative changes in most Member States. Although the changes
would promote Community-wide decision making, the particular changes re-
quired might not always benefit individual Member States. For this reason, it
appears unlikely that the Vredeling Proposal will soon be adopted. 153 Member
States are hesitant to support a proposal that would limit their ability to determine
what role employees should play in corporate governance.
The Vredeling Proposal would not implement worker participation in the
traditional sense by establishing a board of employees directly involved in deci-
sion making as required by the Fifth Directive. 15 4 Instead, employee involvement
would be achieved through the development of a regularized relationship between
management and workers. The Vredeling Proposal mandates two types of ac-
Social Affairs of the European Community. See Blanpain, Introduction to R. BLANPAIN, F. BLAN-
QUET, F HERMAN & A. MOUTY, THE VREDELING PROPOSAL 17 (1983).
149. COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, AMENDED PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL DIREC-
TIVE ON PROCEDURES FOR INFORMING AND CONSULTING THE EMPLOYEES OF UNDERTAKINGS WITH
COMPLEX STRUCTURES, IN PARTICULAR TRANSNATIONAL UNDERTAKINGS, BULL. EUR. COMM. SUP.
2/83 (1983) [hereinafter cited as VREDELING PROPOSAL]. See generally Pipkom, The Draft Directive
on Procedures for Informing and Consulting Employees, 20 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 725 (1983); R.
BLANPAIN, F. BLANQUET, F HERMAN & A. MOUTY, supra note 148; EEC-"Vredeling" Revised: A
Commentary, EUR. INDUS. REL. REV., August 1983, at 7.
The draft presently under consideration is an amended version of the original Vredeling Proposal.
See Proposal for a Council Directive on procedures for informing and consulting the employees of
undertakings with complex structures, in particular transnational undertakings, 23 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. C 297) 3 (1980) reprinted and analyzed in COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL DIRECTIVE ON PROCEDURES FOR INFORMING AND CONSULTING THE
EMPLOYEES OF UNDERTAKINGS WITH COMPLEX STRUCTURES, IN PARTICULAR TRANSNATIONAL UN-
DERTAKINGS, BULL. EUR. COMM. SUPP. 3/80 (1980). See generally Note, Multinational Regulation
of MNE Labor Relations, 4 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 409 (1981).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 22-26. The Vredeling Proposal is based on the same
provisions of the Treaty of Rome as Directive 75/129 and Directive 77/187.
151. VREDELING PROPOSAL, supra note 149, at Preamble.
152. The Preamble of the VREDELING PROPOSAL, supra note 149, states that: "these information
and consultation requirements [Directives 75/129 and 77/187, and the Fifth Directive] do not aim to
cover all situations likely to affect the employees' interests and, in particular, do not extend specifi-
cally to decisions taken at parent company level rather than independently by the employing
subsidiary."
153. The Council tabled discussion of the Vredeling Proposal in December 1983, noting that its
adoption will not be possible until there is a change of administration in Great Britain. At present,
only France and Greece favor implementation of the Vredeling Proposal. The FRG favors legislation
in the area but believes the present plan may have a detrimental impact upon industrial relations. See
Council Refers Vredeling Back, I I INDUS. REL. EUR., December 1983, at 1; European Labor Minis-
ters Fail to Approve Plan for Employees of Multinational Firms, DAILY LAB. REV., BUREAU NAT'L
AFF., CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS, December 13, 1983, at A-2.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 129-132.
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tivity, the provision of information to employees and consultation with employ-
ees. These activities would become part of the normal decision-making process
of the corporation.
The information prong is satisfied if the parent undertaking, at least once a
year, provides employee representatives with a clear picture of the activities of
the parent undertaking and its subsidiaries. 155 The information conveyed must
include all relevant facts regarding the economic and financial situation of the
company, as well as information regarding the employment situation and proba-
ble trends. 1
5 6
The consultation prong of the Vredeling Proposal requires the management of
the parent undertaking to inform the employee representatives whenever manage-
ment decisions may have serious consequences for workers employed by subsidi-
aries of the company located in the Community. 57 Once the information is
passed to the employee representatives, the employer must, within thirty days,
consult with the representatives "with a view to attempting to reach agree-
ment." 158 The Vredeling Proposal does not require that management and the
employee representatives reach agreement.
The most controversial feature of the Vredeling Proposal is its treatment of
subsidiary undertakings. The Proposal requires corporations to report to the
employee representatives of each subsidiary on the activities of the entire corpo-
ration. 59 By treating parent undertakings and their subsidiaries as one unit, the
Commission hopes to facilitate Community-wide planning and employee in-
volvement in decision making. 160 Both corporations and employees would have
to make decisions based on the effects of the decision throughout the Community
rather than on the effects in a particular Member State.
The Vredeling Proposal has been sharply criticized by employers and Member
States precisely because of its Community oriented approach. 16' Although propo-
155. VREDELING PROPOSAL, supra note 149, at art. 3(1).
156. VREDELING PROPOSAL, supra note 149, at art. 3(2).
157. VREDELING PROPOSAL, supra note 149, at art. 4(1). Examples of relevant management
decisions include the closure or transfer of a business, restrictions or substantial modifications to the
activities of an undertaking, major modifications with regard to organization, working practices or
production methods, including modifications resulting from the introduction of new technologies, the
introduction or cessation of long-term cooperation with other undertakings, and the implementation
of measures relating to workers' health or industrial safety. Id. at art. 4(2). Management must inform
the employee representatives of the grounds for the proposed decision, the legal, economic and social
consequences of the decision for the employees and the measures planned that would affect the
employees. Id. at art. 4(1).
158. VREDELING PROPOSAL, supra note 149, at art. 4(3). Both employers and trade unions have
criticized the use of this phrase because of its ambiguous language. See United Kingdom: the
participation debate continued, EUR. INDUS. REL. REV., June, 1984, at 16-17.
159. VREDELING PROPOSAL, supra note 149, at art. 3(1).
160. See, e.g., COMM'N OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL DIRECTIVE
ON PROCEDURES FOR INFORMING AND CONSULTING THE EMPLOYEES OF UNDERTAKINGS WITH COM-
PLEX STRUCTURES, IN PARTICULAR TRANSNATIONAL UNDERTAKINGS, BULL. EUR. COMM. SUPP.
3/80, at 5 (1980).
161. See, e.g., R. BLANPAIN, F. BLANQUET, F. HERMAN & A. MOUTY, supra note 148, at 75-99;
Kolvenbach, EEC Directive on Information and Consultation of Employees (Vredeling-Proposal), 10
INT'L Bus. LAW. 365 (1982).
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nents of the Vredeling Proposal state that management's final decision-making
powers are not diminished by the draft Proposal, 162 the purpose of the Vredeling
Proposal is to permit workers to receive more information about the activities and
plans of the corporation. 163 Corporations, fearing the leak of vital information,
believe that the benefit to employees is outweighed by the burden placed on the
corporation.
As with the Statute for a European Company and the Fifth Directive, the
Vredeling Proposal attempts to regulate employee involvement in decision mak-
ing at the Community level. Through Community regulation, employees would
have access to the decision-making process, regardless of the nationality of the
company. This internationalization of the decision-making process would in-
crease the power of the Community and facilitate industrial planning at a Com-
munity level. Despite this potential benefit, some'Member States, including the
United Kingdom, are unwilling to risk any loss of power to either the Community
or its workers and refuse to support the Proposal. 64
IV. CONCLUSION
The formation of a common market and the establishment of a common
commercial policy in the European Community have increased the movement of
capital and sources of production among the Member States of the Community.
Community enterprises are becoming larger and more centralized. These devel-
opments have decreased the ability of employees to effectively protect their
interests at a local level.
The European Community has responded by taking an increasingly active role
in employment policy. The Treaty of Rome does not explicitly grant this power to
the Community but it may properly be implied. One focus of the Community has
been the harmonization of the laws of the Member States regarding redundancy.
Two directives, Directive 75/129 on collective redundancies and Directive 77/187
on the transfer of undertakings, businesses, or parts of businesses, have been
adopted. Directive 75/129 requires the Member States to place procedural re-
strictions on the dismissal of employees in a redundancy situation. Directive
77/187 requires Member States to adopt provisions placing procedural re-
strictions in the form of notification and informational rights to employees when
there is a transfer of an undertaking. It also grants limited substantive rights in
that employees may not automatically be dismissed when an undertaking is
transferred.
Both of these directives were modelled after West German statutes and had
virtually no effect within the FRG. The FRG, however, supports the directives
since they bring all Member States closer to West German standards, thereby
lessening the threat of investment leaving the FRG for other Member States.
162. See Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Directive on
procedures for informing and consulting the employees of undertakings with complex structures, in
particular transnational undertakings, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 77) 6, 9 (1982).
163. VREDELING PROPOSAL, supra note 149, at Preamble.
164. See, e.g., United Kingdom: The Participation Debate (pts. I & 2), EUR. INDUS. REL. REV.,
March, 1984, at 13, EUR. INDUS. REL. REV., June, 1984, at 16.
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The United Kingdom enacted legislation to implement both directives. The
procedural restrictions of the directives have been implemented in such a way that
they will have little effect; the substantive restrictions required by the directives
are minimal and are also unlikely to have any effect.
The Community's second approach to employment policy is to grant workers a
broader right to participate in the management of the enterprise. Although this
approach appears more promising, the Community has not successfully imple-
mented any directives or regulations mandating worker participation. Several
factors, primarily political, have made this process exceedingly difficult. The
unanimity requirement contained in Articles 100 and 235 of the Treaty of Rome
requires agreement that can rarely be reached on issues so controversial. The
differing historical, legal, and cultural backgrounds of the Member States make
agreement even more difficult.
It seems then that neither approach has worked particularly well. The direc-
tives harmonizing dismissal procedures have had little effect and the worker
participation proposals have met with such resistance that they have not been
adopted. The inability of the Community to effectively require Member States to
adopt and implement provisions harmonizing laws regarding employee involve-
ment in decision making has a detrimental impact on the Community as well as
its workers. Living and working conditions vary greatly throughout the Member
States and prevent the Community from operating as one economic unit. This, in
turn, hinders the development of a successful Community industrial strategy.
